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THE EMS - THE FIRST TEN YEARS
POLICIES - DEVELOPMENTS - EVOLUTION 
Horst Ungerer
I
When the EEC came into being in 1958, the world of international 
exchange rates was in order, the Bretton Woods system was in place and 
functioning, and the US dollar was strong and fully met its responsi­
bilities as the key currency of the international monetary system. The 
EEC Treaty dealt mainly with the problem of customs union and not so 
much with that of implementing common economic policies and establishing 
an economic and monetary union. Consequently, the Treaty says rela­
tively little - and this in fairly general terms - about economic, 
monetary and exchange-rate policies. Art.103 declares the conjunctural 
policies of Member States "a matter of common concern”. Art. 104 
defines the ”magic triangle" - balance-of-payments equilibrium, high 
level of employment and price stability - as the general objectives for 
economic policy. Significantly, the fourth "corner” of the "magic 
quadrangle", exchange-rate stability, is not even mentioned: it was
taken more or less for granted. Art.105 calls on Member States to
This article was written during a study leave from the International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, in spring and summer 1989, which the author 
spent at the European University Institute, Florence, and at the 
Institut fur Weitwirtschaft, Kiel. The views expressed here are not 




























































































coordinate their economic and monetary policies. With regard to 
exchange-rate policy, Art.107 simply states that "each Member State 
shall treat its policy with regard to the rate of exchange as a matter 
of common concern". Art.108 institutes, in case of balance of payments 
difficulties of a member country, the possibility of "mutual assistance" 
including but not limited to financial assistance.
As the customs union reached completion and as concerns about the 
stability of the international monetary system mounted in the second 
half of the '60s, the EEC focused increasingly on the question of how to 
develop the customs union into an economic and monetary union and how to 
organize a common approach to monetary and exchange-rate policies. An 
extensive debate about the best approach ensued between "economists" and 
"monetarists": the latter school basically arguing that one should
first establish common monetary institutions and policies, and then 
everything would fall into place; the former saying that first a high 
degree of convergence of economic policies and developments was needed, 
and then a common monetary policy and a common European currency could 
be aimed at as a "crowning" achievement. If this sounds somewhat 
familiar to the reader, this is not accidental: a large part of the
more recent debate about the creation of a European central bank and a 
common currency is being conducted in similar terms.
The EC summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in The Hague 
in December 1969 agreed that "a plan in stages will be worked out... 
with a view to the creation of an economic and monetary union". A 
special committee of high-level experts, under the chairmanship of 



























































































-  3 -
proposals. The "Werner Report" was presented in October 1970, and a 
subsequent Resolution of the EC Council of Ministers of March 1971 
envisaged as significant steps towards economic and monetary union (EMU) 
the reduction and eventual elimination of the existing exchange-rate 
fluctuation margins of 0.75 percent between EC currencies and the 
complete liberalization of capital movements within the EC. The latter 
had already been aimed at in Art.67 of the EEC Treaty but only limited 
progress had been made in the first ten years of the EEC.
The events of 1971 - free floating of the Deutsche mark and the 
Dutch guilder in May, and the suspension of the obligation of the United 
States to convert dollar holdings of other countries into gold in August 
- delayed the first step towards EMU, namely a narrowing of fluctuation 
margins between EC currencies. Eventually, the only tangible result of 
the "Werner Plan" was the creation of the European common margins 
arrangement in April 1972, in response to the changed conditions of the 
international monetary system. 1/ The "Smithsonian Agreement" of 
December 1971, restored, for a while, fixed exchange rates and 
implemented a regime of "wider margins" for the fluctuation of the 
market rates for individual currencies of * 2.25 percent around their US 
dollar central rates as compared to 1 .0 percent under the IMF Articles 
of Agreement, and 0.75 percent for European currencies under the 
European Monetary Agreement. This widened the maximum range for the 
fluctuation of market rates between European currencies and the US
1/ Another outcome of the "Werner Report" was the establishment of 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in April 1973 which, however, did 



























































































-  4 -
dollar Co 4.5 percent, and consequently that between European currencies 
to 9 percent. The European common margins arrangement introduced between 
EC currencies fluctuation margins of _ 2.25 percent around their 
bilateral central rates, thus narrowing the maximum range of fluctuation 
for market rates to 4.5 percent and setting the EC currencies vis-à-vis 
each other on the same footing as vis-à-vis the dollar. The "snake in 
the tunnel" was created. 1/ After the transition to general floating in 
March 1973, the "tunnel" - i.e. the fluctuation band vis-à-vis the 
dollar - around the "snake" disappeared, and the snake currencies 
floated jointly against the US dollar and other third currencies.
The history of the snake was a lively one. Originally all 
currencies of the EC countries (including the "newcomers" of 1973, 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) took part in the arrangement, 
while Norway and Sweden were formally and Austria informally associated 
with the EC currency group. As time went on, pressures within the snake 
made it difficult for countries to honor their obligations under the 
arrangement. As a consequence, early on the United Kingdom (together 
with Ireland), later Italy and France left the snake rather than 
embarking on appropriate adjustment efforts. At one point Sweden and, 
just before the establishment of the EMS in March 1979, also Norway 
ceased to participate. Thus, the European currency bloc had shrunk to 
the currencies of Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands
1/ For more details, see Gunter Wittich and Masaki Shiratori: The
Snake in the Tunnel, in: Finance and Development, Washington,
June 1973; and Commission of the European Communities: Documents
relating to the European Monetary System, Annex A, European Economy, 



























































































-  5 -
being grouped around the Deutsche mark, the only larger EC currency 
remaining in the bloc. While this arrangement worked operationally 
quite smoothly and served its participants well, it was characterized by 
several small realignments, betraying a lack of economic convergence; 
being composed of only five of the EC countries, it could hardly be 
called a ’’European" arrangement any longer.
II
There were a number of proposals to provide the EC with a more 
unified exchange-rate system as a framework for cooperation in the 
monetary field and as a starting-point for relaunching efforts towards 
EMU. Among the most interesting ones were proposals by the then 
Ministers of Finance in France, Fourcade, (who suggested a "boa" with 
wider margins around the "snake") and the Netherlands, Duisenberg (wo 
recommended "target zones" for EC currencies). Among non-official 
proposals was the idea of moving towards monetary union by means of 
introducing a European "parallel" currency. 1/
Within the EC, concerns increased about the stagnation of the 
integration process. After the completion of the customs union and the 
adoption of a common trade policy (as stipulated in Article 113 of the 
EEC Treaty) in 1968, and the earlier establishment of a common market
1/ E.g. see the "All Saints' Day Manifesto for European Monetary 




























































































-  6 -
for most agricultural goods, not much had been achieved in other areas, 
and there was the fear that in not moving forward the EC was actually 
moving backwards. In the '70s great uncertainties in the international 
economy, stemming from sharp increases in the prices of oil and other 
sources of energy and the lack of stability and predictability in the 
exchange rates between the US dollar and other currencies, were 
accompanied by strong increases in inflation within the EC and through­
out the world, although differing significantly from country to country.
The challenge for the EC was clear: to regain momentum in the
European integration process, to fight inflation, and to work towards a 
greater stability of exchange rates. This was the starting point for 
the initiatives which eventually led to the creation of the EMS.
It was in a speech at the European University Institute in Florence 
in October 1977, that the President of the EC Commission, Roy Jenkins, 
called for a fresh look at the case for European monetary union. 1/ In 
December 1977, the European Council "reaffirmed its attachment to the 
objective of economic and monetary union".
In 1978, the French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and the 
German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, took the initiative for the 
establishment of a common monetary system for the EC which would combine 
formal commitments to more stable exchange rates with the effort to work 
towards domestic monetary and price stability. At its summit in Bremen 
in July 1978, the European Council discussed a "scheme for the creation
1/ Roy Jenkins: Europe's present challenge and future opportunity, 





























































































of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary stability 
in Europe". In its meeting in Brussels on December 4 and 5, 1978, the 
European Council agreed that "a European Monetary System (EMS) will be 
set up", and it was resolved "to ensure the lasting success of the EMS 
by policies conducive to greater stability at home and abroad for both 
deficit and surplus countries".
The EMS went into operation on 13 March 1979. Belgium and 
Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands 
decided to participate in all aspects of the EMS, including the 
obligations of the common exchange-rate and intervention mechanism. The 
United Kingdom signed the EMS agreement but did not join the 
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM), thus in essence maintaining a freely 
floating exchange rate vis-à-vis the other EC countries as well as the 
rest of the world. 1/
It is not necessary to describe here the operational features of 
the EMS; this has been done in other places. 2/ But two important 
elements deserve to be mentioned which throw a particular light on the 
EMS and which are important for understanding its evolution in the first 
ten years of its existence.
Firstly, the EMS is not just a mini-Bretton Woods system (BWS) on a
1/ The countries who joined the EC after the inception of the EMS - 
Greece, Portugal, Spain - signed the EMS Agreement but initially did not 
become participants in the ERM. As of June 19, 1989, Spain is 
participating in the ERM.
2/ Horst Ungerer: The European Monetary System, in: International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Survey, Washington March 19, 1979, Supplement; 
Commission of the European Communities: The European Monetary System -




























































































regional scale. It was not designed to (and in the first years did not) 
center on one dominant currency as the BWS centered on the US dollar.
The later evolution of the EMS in which the Deutsche mark became the 
"anchor currency" for the system was not a matter of design but rather 
of policy preferences and operational developments over the years. In 
the EMS, there is a common decision-making process with regard to parity 
("central rate") changes, in contrast to the regime of parity changes 
under the BWS, which were initiated by an individual country and 
required only the "concurrence" of the IMF, which was given more or less 
as a matter of routine. 1/ Generally speaking, the EMS in its 
intentions and with regard to the implementation of its decisions and 
operations has a clear political dimension, with the objective of 
European integration playing an important role, and with strong efforts 
being made to balance common and national interests. In the view of 
this observer, this is one major reason why the EMS survived a number of 
critical periods and why a number of sceptics, inside and outside 
official circles, who predicted an early demise of the EMS proved to be 
mistaken.
Secondly, the EMS is not just another version of the snake. In the 
first place, it comprises a larger number of EC countries, including 
three of the four largest countries. Central rate changes, as discussed 
above, are decided upon by following an established common procedure.
1/ On this point, see also Massimo Russo: Cooperation and 
Coordination in the EMS - The System at a Crossroad, in: Internationales 
Wahrungssystem und weltwirtschaftliche Entwicklung (The International 
Monetary System and Economic Development), Proceedings from the Malente 



























































































-  9 -
Furthermore, the EMS has as a general objective to strive for exchange 
rate stability under conditions of internal stability. There is strong 
emphasis and peer pressure to rely in case of imbalances not only on 
"corrective" central rate changes but also on internal adjustment 
policies. This implies a preference for not only correcting past policy 
actions and their consequences but for providing a disciplinary 
constraint for future policy actions. That this over time led to a 
discussion about the general policy orientation of the EMS will be 
discussed later.
The following sections describe developments and policies in the 
EMS. Somewhat arbitrarily, a distinction is being made between three 
phases of development, the first one up to 1982/83; the second up to 
1987; and the third reaching into the present discussion over the future 
course of monetary integration in the EC. 1/
III
The first phase of the EMS can be described as a period of trial and 
orientation. In those first years, the EMS resembled the snake in a 
number of aspects. Economic developments in EMS countries continued to 
be divergent as the authorities responded differently and with a varying
1/ In a short summary of developments in the EMS, the EC Commission 
introduces a similar distinction between three main phases, however, 
with a somewhat different emphasis. See Commission of the European 





























































































sense of priorities to the challenges of an inflationary world-economic 
environment which at the same time was characterized by low growth and 
high unemployment. In the period 1974-78 (that is the period following 
the first round of oil price increases), the consumer price index (CPI) 
for the ERM countries as a whole had risen on an annual average by 8.9 
percent; for Germany the increase was only 4.7 percent, and for the 
Netherlands 7.9 per cent, while in France the increase amounted to 10.7 
percent and in Italy to 16.4 percent. In the years 1979-81, i.e. 
following the inception of the EMS, the average annual rise of the CPI 
for Germany was 5.2 per cent and for the Netherlands 5.8 percent; for 
France the figure was 12.5 percent and for Italy 17.9 percent. Yet, 
short-term interest rates which in Germany nearly tripled from 1978 to 
1981, increased during the same period in France less than twofold 
(although on a higher level). In Italy, the rise in short-term rates 
was even less. 1/ A similar picture emerges if one compares the rate of 
growth of domestic credit. In Germany, the growth rate declined 
persistently from 1979 to 1983, while in France and Italy the growth 
rates remained on average on their high earlier levels. 2/ These 
differences indicate that inflation in France and Italy throughout those 
years was significantly worse than in Germany, but also that in France 
and Italy less of an effort was being made to correct this situation.
1/ Horst Ungerer, Owen Evans, Peter Nyberg: The European Monetary 
System: The Experience, 1979-82, International Monetary Fund, Occasional 
Paper No. 19, Washington 1983, Tables 12 and 14.
2/ Horst Ungerer, Owen Evans, Thomas Mayer, Philip Young: The 
European Monetary System: Recent Developments, International Monetary 




























































































One important factor for economic developments in France was the shift 
in economic and fiscal policy to a clearly expansionary line, following 
the success of Francois Mitterand in the presidential elections of May 
1981.
The consequence of this divergence in economic policies and 
developments were a total of seven realignments of central rates in the 
ERM from 1979 to March 1983. The most important feature was a downward 
shift of the French franc but also of the Italian lira mainly vis-à-vis 
the Deutsche mark and the Dutch guilder (October 1981; June 1982; March 
1983; see Table).
The realignments of February 1982 and March 1983 mark in a number 
of ways a turn-around in the history of the EMS. With the benefit of 
hindsight, the question can be asked whether without this turn-around, 
the EMS would have continued to exist or, at least, whether it would not 
have developed into a less cohesive and stable system which would have 
failed to move towards its main objectives of "external and internal 
stability".
The two realignments established that in the EMS central rate 
changes would be no longer a matter of unilateral decisions, with which 
partner countries would concur, but indeed common decisions. 
Consequently, discussions on realignments became increasingly 
politically charged, difficult, and at times even acrimonious. To this 
observer, it is only natural that in view of differing national 
viewpoints and priorities, common decisions which are to be economically 
and politically acceptable to all participants entail tough negotiations 






















































































































































































time aimed at avoiding such difficulties, e.g., by introducing many 
small realignments or a crawling peg. Such proposals did not fully 
recognize the dynamics of a common decision-making process by placing 
strong emphasis on domestic adjustment policies to accompany exchange 
rate changes, and its positive contribution to the domestic opinion­
forming process. As the convergence of economic developments improved 
over time, the idea of having smaller (and also fewer) realignments 
became more realistic.
The significance of the February 1982 realignment was that Belgium 
accepted a noticeably lower devaluation than it had initially sought and 
seemed justified by the commonly used indicators of external 
competitiveness. This established in the EMS the "hard currency" 
strategy which avoids compensating fully for past losses in 
competitiveness and takes a dynamic, future-oriented approach with 
emphasis on internal adjustment. 1/ With the agreed exchange rate 
change, a clear stand was also taken against even a presumption of 
competitive devaluation, reflecting a concern of other countries with 
regard to their own competitiveness. The devaluation marked for Belgium 
also the beginning of more decisive internal adjustment policies, 
initially in the area of prices and wages, later on also in the 
budgetary field.
The realignment of March 1983 was significant in a number of 
respects. In the first place it was the most comprehensive realignment
1/ For a detailed discussion of the Irish experience with a "hard 
currency" strategy, see Jeroen J.M. Kremers: Gaining Policy Credibility




























































































so far, with changes in the central rates of all participating 
currencies, while in earlier realignments some currencies stayed put, 
and central rates of other currencies were changed in relation to those 
currencies. In March 1983, all central rates were either revalued or 
devalued against a hypothetical zero line. From a purely economic 
standpoint it may not matter whether a currency devalues or revalues; it 
is the relative shift in central rates which is of relevance. 
Psychologically, things are somewhat different. Market perceptions and, 
hence, expectations, may be influenced by whether a shift in central 
rates is called a devaluation or revaluation. Politically, the word 
"devaluation" still carries a notion of defeat which may adversely 
affect the external and the domestic standing of a government.
Secondly, the realignment signalled a reordering of economic policy 
priorities in those countries which previously had sought to combine the 
aim of stable exchange rates within the ERM with expansionary policies. 
France, in particular, decided to give top priority to domestic cost and 
price stability. To this end, the French authorities adopted a 
comprehensive stabilization program, making the commitment to stay in 
the EMS and to aim at a stable exchange rate credible by introducing a 
series of domestic adjustment measures. This program was supported by a 
medium-term credit under the EC's Community loan mechanism, amounting to 
ECU 4 billion. The stabilization program was successful in restoring 
external competitiveness and affecting positively inflationary and 




























































































authorities were able to repay the credit in advance of maturity. 1/
The French decision, and the support for it by partner countries, 
reflected on the one hand a renewed joint commitment to the EMS and, 
ultimately, to a continuation of the process of economic and political 
cooperation within the EC. On the other hand, there was the 
realization that not taking this decision would probably have resulted 
in France temporarily or permanently leaving the EMS. This could have 
led to a significantly larger devaluation of the French franc than 
undertaken in the realignment, fueling inflation in France and seriously 
undermining the credibility of French economic policy at home and 
abroad.
It was also during this first phase of the EMS' development, in 
December 1980, that initial plans to consolidate the EMS, not later than 
two years after the start, into a "final system" were postponed 
indefinitely. This final system was to entail the creation of a 
European Monetary Fund and the full utilization of the ECU as a reserve 
asset and a means of settlement.
IV
The time following the realignments of 1982 and 1983 can be seen as
1/ For a short characterization of the French program, see Ungerer et 
al. (1986), p. 6. For a discussion of the French experience in the EMS, 
see Harald Eggerstedt, Stefan Sinn: The EMS 1979-1986: The Economics





























































































the second phase of the development of the EMS and as a period of 
consolidation. It was characterized by a widespread consensus to follow 
stability-oriented policies, an increasing convergence in the 
development of costs, prices and monetary aggregates, and by long 
periods without realignments of central rates.
It is also during this phase that the Deutsche mark evolved as the 
"anchor currency" of the system and that the anti-inflationary policies 
of the German monetary authorities became the reference point for the 
policies of the other partner countries. Already during the snake 
period, the Netherlands conducted policies that moved more or less in 
tandem with Germany. Now, after the economic turmoil of the '70s and 
the early '80s, other countries also recognized the importance of 
anti-inflationary policies for their own economies.
In terms of exchange-rate policy, this meant that countries 
increasingly sought to stabilize the exchange rates of their currencies 
against the Deutsche mark, and to support such a peglike link if 
necessary by intervention in German currency within the margins and by 
maintaining appropriate interest rate differentials vis-à-vis Germany.
Already in the early phase of the EMS intra-marginal intervention 
had gained preference over intervention at the margins. It was then 
mainly seen as an instrument to counter exchange-rate movements from the 
very start, before they could develop a momentum of their own. Due to 
the institutional constraints on the use of partner currencies for 
intra-marginal intervention, and the more ready availability of the US 
dollar, this currency became initially the preferred intervention 




























































































to a realignment, were exchange rates allowed to move to the outer 
limits of the band, where intervention in partner currencies was 
employed (with the consequent use of the very short-term financing 
facility (VSTF) and its settlement rules).
With the reorientation of policy priorities, the Deutsche mark 
became the main currency for intra-marginal intervention also for those 
countries which formerly had exclusively used the US dollar. Linking 
their currencies in this way to the mark, the monetary authorities of 
other countries were able to import stability, to exert adjustment 
pressure on their own economies by implementing a supportive high 
interest-rate policy, and to gain credibility in their stabilization 
efforts by being very closely associated with the successful economic 
policy strategy of the German authorities.
The EMS Agreement basically limited the provision of the currencies 
by partner central banks for intervention purposes to obligatory 
intervention at the margins. Intra-marginal interventions in partner 
currencies had to be financed out of holdings in these currencies (which 
under the EMS Agreement are to be limited to working balances), and were 
subject to approval by the issuing central bank. As intra-marginal 
intervention was increasingly seen as a valid tool for regular 
intervention, the term "working balances" was interpreted in a very 
liberal fashion. This allowed central banks to acquire partner 
currencies on the market at times of strength of their own currencies, 
and to use them at times of weakness. The Bundesbank, as the issuer of 
the main ERM intervention currency, accepted and at times encouraged 




























































































intervention for the stability of the system as a whole - an important 
aspect for a large exporter - but also for reasons of its own monetary 
policy. Any intervention at the margins which required the provision of 
Deutsche marks under the VSTF implied an injection of additional 
liquidity into the market, with the potential of upsetting the 
Bundesbank's monetary targets. Intra-marginal intervention, involving 
the use of other central banks' holdings of Deutsche marks, on the other 
hand, did not imply the creation of additional liquidity. This 
consideration also explains why during the discussions about the further 
development of the EMS, the Bundesbank took initially such a strong line 
against the possibility of allowing the automatic financing of 
intra-marginal intervention through the VSTF.
While in most situations the existing arrangement and 
understandings concerning intra-marginal intervention in partner 
currencies worked well, there remained two main sources for complaint. 
Firstly, in suddenly changing market conditions which could take on the 
character of an emergency situation, the procedure for obtaining 
approval for intra-marginal intervention could prove to be too 
cumbersome and time-consuming, despite the efficient and extensive 
communication network in existence between EMS central banks. There was 
also the more political aspect of central banks having to seek from 
partner central banks permission to carry out transactions which were 
generally seen as useful and in the interest of the system. Another 
concern was that due to the important position of the Deutsche mark in 
international exchange markets and its role as an alternate reserve 




























































































EMS currencies was increasingly determined by the dollar policy and 
transactions of the Bundesbank. Ironically, the increased reliance on 
intra-marginal intervention in partner currencies instead of the dollar 
made the dominant position of the Deutsche mark in this respect even 
more pronounced. Since the exchange rate of the dollar exerts a 
powerful influence particularly on trade developments and inflation in 
EMS countries, there were calls for a common dollar policy for the 
EMS. The Bundesbank, on the other hand, in view of the exposed position 
of the mark as an international reserve currency was concerned that a 
common dollar policy would not sufficiently safeguard its domestic 
monetary targets. 1/
Various proposals on how to modify the EMS were put forward. The 
EC Commission presented in 1985 a package of proposals which were 
intensively discussed by the competent EC bodies. While some considered 
that the adoption of these proposals would strengthen the EMS and 
contribute to its quest for exchange-rate stability, others put strong 
emphasis on the adjustment aspect within an exchange-rate system and 
felt that any mechanism which would weaken the resolve to adjust in time 
would actually weaken the EMS. It is therefore not surprising that no 
agreement could be reached on the proposals of the Commission. 
Nevertheless, with effect from July 1, 1985, it was agreed to supplement 
the existing mechanisms of the EMS mainly in order to improve the
1/ For further comments on the problems of a common dollar policy, 
see Horst Ungerer, The European Monetary System and the International 




























































































usability and attractiveness of the ECU. 1/ Under the new provisions, 
central banks in need of other currencies for the purpose of 
intra-marginal intervention can obtain these currencies by mobilizing, 
through the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, their net creditor 
positions in ECUs and part of their ECU allocation. Other parts of the 
package linked the interest rate on net holding in ECUs more closely to 
market rates, and provided for the possibility of "other holders", i.e • 
holders other than EMS members, of official ECUs.
The mobilization scheme has been used only twice by Italy. The 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Swiss National Bank and, 
more recently, the Austrian National Bank, became "other holders". In 
general, however, the agreement was of limited importance. In 
particular, it did not do very much to enhance the status and the use of 
official ECUs. This can be traced back to a number of reasons.
Firstly, while the 1978 Resolution designated the ECU to be at the 
center of the system, the ECU plays only a very limited role in the 
determination of central rates within the ERM. Also, the divergence 
indicator 2/ which is based on the ECU never gained any policy 
relevance. As a means of settlement of intervention debts, the role of 
the ECU was subject to an acceptance limit of 50 percent and confined to 
obligatory intervention which - as described above - does not account 
for the bulk of intervention. Finally, the ECU is not in demand as a
1/ See EC Commission (1989), Appendix I.
2/ The divergence indicator signals whether a currency diverges in 
its movement from the average of others. This may lead to a presumption 
that the authorities concerned will take corrective action. For details 




























































































reserve asset, reflecting its limited usability. In general terms, the 
ECU suffers from the ambiguous attitude of EC countries and central 
banks adopted from the very beginning of the EMS. While at least some 
countries had hoped to be able to mobilize part of their de facto frozen 
gold holdings, and thus to use ECUs more extensively to back up their 
intervention needs, even countries in principle favourably inclined 
towards the ECU were not willing to permanently exchange part of their 
reserve holdings (in particular gold) against ECUs. Hence, the 
curiously transitional arrangement of renewable three month swaps as a 
basis for the allocation of ECUs, which requires reconfirmation every 
two years. 1/
This situation has been frequently decried as robbing the EMS of 
part of its "European identity" and as being contrary to the intentions 
of the creators of the EMS. While the latter is not fully correct as 
shown above, the more important practical aspect is probably that the 
actual evolution of the EMS did not allow the ECU to play a greater 
role. This reflects the fact that the EMS was from the beginning 
designed to be flexible so as to meet emerging needs and policies, and 
much less to accord with presentational and political demands other than 
through its existence in general and its actual achievements.
1/ For more on the limited significance of the ECU, see Hans-Eckart 
Scharrer: Das EWS - Ein Beispiel erfolgreicher Wirtschaftskooperation?
in: Internationales Wahrungssystem und weltwirtschaftliche Entwicklung
(The International Monetary System and Economic Development), 
Proceedings from the Malente Symposion VII, Baden-Baden 1988, p. 261; 
Alfred Steinherrï The EMS with the ECU at Centre Stage, European 
University Institute, Florence, Working Paper No. 88/339, pp. 1-2; Rolf 
Hasse: Die ECU - ein Wahrungsmedium mit Integrationswirkungen? in:




























































































In contrast to its official use, the ECU became quite popular as a 
financial instrument in private markets. In essence, the private ECU is 
an asset which consists of the same basket of EC currencies as the 
official ECU but is being made available for transactions between 
private market participants. It serves as a hedge against the 
exchange-rate risks of individual currencies and tries to capitalize on 
the higher interest rates for assets denominated in weaker currencies. 
The market for private ECU in its first years grew rapidly, although it 
was to a large extent limited to inter-bank transactions. The private 
ECU became the fourth largest investment currency, although its market 
share remained quite small. More recently, the rapid growth of the 
private ECU market slowed down significantly. 1/
What I called the second phase in the development of the EMS was a 
period of consolidation: low inflation rates became the main priority;
the Deutsche mark evolved as the ’’anchor currency" of the system, not 
least because the German monetary authorities had followed consistently 
for many years a stability-oriented policy; a substantial degree of 
convergence with regard to inflation rates and the growth of monetary 
aggregates was achieved; and there were no multi-currency realignments
1/ For a discussion of the markets for the private ECU, see Hasse 
(1988); The Role of the SDR in the International Monetary System, 
International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 51, Washington, 1987; 
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for more than three years. But it was also a period when a number of 
policy and operational features of the EMS started to be questioned.
During the third phase in the development of the EMS —  starting in 
late 1986/early 1987 —  concerns over the state of the EMS became more 
pronounced in some partner countries, particularly in France and 
Italy. 1/ The system was considered to be asymmetric: politically,
because it was dominated by the currency of one member country, Germany; 
and economically, because too much emphasis was laid on price stability 
at a time when low economic growth and high unemployment were 
increasingly seen as threats. Operationally, the management of the 
system which favoured intra-marginal intervention, thus precluding the 
financing of intervention through the VSTF, was seen as putting the 
burden of adjustment unevenly on the countries with weaker 
currencies. 2/
The realignment of January 12, 1987 was small in scale: the 
Deutsche mark and the Netherlands guilder revalued by 3 percent, the
1/ See the memoranda by the Finance Ministers of France and Italy; 
Edouard Balladur: Mémorandum sur la construction monétaire européenne,
in: ECU No. 3, Brussels, March 1988; Giuliano Amato: Un motore per lo
Sme, in: Il Sole - 24 Ore, February 25, 1988. For a response, see
Leonhard Gleske: Die Fortentwicklung des Europâischen Wahrungssystems,
Ausführungen vor dem Ausschuss fur Wirtschaft, Wahrung und Industrie- 
politik des Europâischen Parlaments, Brussels, February 22, 1988, in: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Ausziige aus Presseartikeln, March 1, 1988.
2/ The question of asymmetry in the EMS generated also a discussion 
in academic circles. See, e.g., Charles Wyplosz: Asymmetry in the 
EMS: Intentional or Systemic? Research Working Papers 88/41, Institut
Européen d'Administration des Affaires, Fontainebleau, 1988; Paul de 
Grauwe: Is the European Monetary System a DM-Zone? CEPS Working Paper,
Brussels 1989; Richard Portes: Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and
the European Monetary System, Paper presented for the conference "The 





























































































Belgian and Luxembourg francs by 2 percent against all other currencies 
in the ERM. But two aspects made it a point of crystallization for 
criticism. There was wide agreement that the realignment had not been 
caused by the loss of international competitiveness by some countries 
but by disturbances in international markets, i.e. a drastic fall in the 
US dollar in the second half of 1986 and again in the beginning of 1987 
which affected various ERM currencies differently and put pressure in 
particular on the French franc. Secondly, it was felt that the 
realignment could have been avoided by a better coordination of monetary 
policies, in particular with regard to interest rates, and if the system 
had been in a position to respond to the emerging crisis more 
adequately.
At the conclusion of the realignment meeting, the EC Finance 
Ministers requested the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the 
Monetary Committee to examine measures to strengthen the EMS. The 
result of the discussions in these two bodies was an agreement on a 
package of measures which the Committee of Central Bank Governors 
adopted in Basle and which was endorsed by the Ministers of Economics 
and Finance of the EC at their meeting in Nyborg on September 12, 1987, 
the so-called Basle-Nyborg agreement. Its main elements were:
a closer monitoring of monetary developments within the EMS and 
vis-à-vis third currencies, with a view to detecting possible 
trouble spots well in advance;
orientation of monetary policies towards narrowing the remaining 





























































































- improved coordination of interest-rate policies and a more
flexible use of existing fluctuation margins in order to deter 
speculation and to avoid prolonged bouts of intra-marginal 
intervention;
liberalization of the rules for the financing of intra-marginal 
intervention by introducing the presumption that such 
intervention, if agreed to by the issuing central bank, will be 
financed under the VSTF, subject to specified quantitative limits 
and conditions. 1/
There was also a consensus that future realignments should be 
infrequent and as small as possible, so as to make speculation 
unrewarding. This was seen as possible in view of the increased 
convergence in economic performance achieved over past years.
The Basle-Nyborg agreement had a mixed reception. By some, it was 
seen as an important but only first step towards a strengthening of the 
EMS. Others saw no further need for institutional changes provided 
national policies continued to be oriented towards more convergence. In 
Germany, the agreement came under strong criticism. By concentrating 
almost exclusively on the extended financing provisions, it was feared 
that this would undermine adjustment efforts in weak currency countries 
and would erode the ability of the Bundesbank to conduct a stability- 
oriented monetary policy. In a special meeting with the press on 
September 14, 1987, the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Mr. Pohl,




























































































defended and explained the agreement in some detail. 1/
Within a short time, the new arrangements became subject to a 
severe test in the aftermath of the Wall Street crash in October 1987.
In the wake of the sharp fall of share prices in US stock markets, the 
dollar dropped against European currencies by more than 10 per cent in a 
matter of a few weeks. As international money sought refuge in the 
Deutsche mark, seen as the main alternate reserve currency, strong 
tensions developed within the ERM, and some currencies, in particular 
the French franc, came under heavy pressure. However, the affected 
central banks successfully managed the situation by concerted action in 
several fields. The Banque de France increased its interest rates 
significantly, while the Bundesbank lowered its lending rates to their 
lowest levels ever. The French franc was allowed to depreciate within 
the band by about 2 per cent. At the same time, massive intra-marginal 
intervention, financed to the newly agreed maximum through the VSTF and 
additionally by a bilateral arrangement between the Bundesbank and the 
Banque de France, kept the market rate for the French franc above its 
lower intervention point, thus convincing the market of the 
determination of the authorities to stick to existing central rates 
within the ERM. In joint communiqués France and Germany emphasized that 
in a difficult international financial situation, the EMS was able to 
preserve stability among European currencies and in particular between 
the French franc and the Deutsche mark.
The viability of the EMS had been proven and the credibility of the
1/ See Deutsche Bundesbank, Ausziige aus Presseartikeln, September 16, 




























































































monetary authorities had been greatly enhanced. Operationally, the EMS 
continued to function smoothly. The view that the development of 
competitiveness in the participating countries did not indicate the need 
for a realignment was generally accepted. Noticeable interest-rate 
differentials helped to keep the ERM in balance. Significant rate 
fluctuations between the US dollar and the ERM currencies during 1988 
and in the first months of 1989 led to debates about the required course 
of economic and financial policies in the US and Europe and about 
appropriate intervention policies. There were other periods of tension 
in the EMS in 1988. In late August/early September 1988, realignments 
rumours emerged in connection with a strengthening of the Deutsche mark, 
and the French and Italian currencies came under pressure. Again, 
following a combination of intervention, interest rate moves, and a 
downward shift in exchange rates of the weaker currencies within their 
fluctuation band, the speculative attacks were successfully arrested.
The continued existence of large budgetary deficits (and their 
partially monetary financing) in some participating countries, 
particularly Italy, and increasing imbalances in the current accounts of 
such countries as Germany (surplus) and France and Italy (deficit) have 
led to questions about future developments. There are also some doubts 
about the longer-term validity of the argument that there was no loss of 
competitiveness on the part of the deficit countries, and that their 
trade imbalances were caused only or chiefly by structural factors which 
could not be corrected by exchange-rate action. The view has been 
gaining some currency that commonly used indicators of competitiveness 




























































































the time being, the existing imbalances have been financed without 
apparent problems, aided by noticeable interest-rate differentials and, 
perhaps, an ,,umbrella,, notion, to the effect that, if needed, the 
existing but largely unused EC medium-term financing facilities would be 
employed in combination with appropriate domestic adjustment measures 
for the defense of a currency in trouble. Market financing of existing 
imbalances also seems to reflect the confidence of the market in the 
continued determination of the authorities to maintain and if necessary 
to defend the existing ERM parity grid. 1/
VI
Following the Basle-Nyborg agreement, the discussion about further 
monetary integration did not come to a halt. Instead of being confined 
to the question of how the EMS should be further developed in order to 
correct its real or perceived deficiencies, the discussion turned 
increasingly to the issues of how the EMS could gradually move towards a 
framework in which monetary and exchange-rate policies would be commonly 
designed, or whether the EMS should be replaced at an early stage by a 
common European currency under the administration of a European central 
bank.
1/ Following a period of three years without realignment, effective 
January 8, 1990, the Italian lira was revalued by 3.7 percent vis-à-vis 
its parties currencies in the ERM. At the same time, Italy accepted the 
narrow margins of * 2.25 percent. This leaves SjDain as the only ERM 
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This shift in emphasis from the problems of an exchange-rate system 
to the much broader issue of monetary unification was in large part 
related to two developments. The one was the so-called single market 
program, i.e., the setting in motion of a process under which the 
formation of a single internal market for the EC would be completed by 
removing all existing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, 
persons and capital within the EC by the end of 1992. This single 
market program was the main objective of the Single European Act, a 
series of amendments to the treaties establishing the European 
Communities which was adopted by all EC countries in 1987.
The question has been raised whether a single market could achieve 
optimal results and would function satisfactorily if national currencies 
and with them the possibility of exchange-rate changes were to continue 
to exist. High transaction costs caused by different currencies and the 
uncertainty implicit in the continued possibility of central rate 
realignments as well as daily fluctuations in market rates could hamper 
the free movements of goods, services, persons and capital and thus 
hinder the formation of a truly single market.
The other event - in fact part of the single market program - was 
the adoption by the EC Council of Ministers in June 1988 of a directive 
on the liberalization of capital movements. The EEC Treaty contains the 
obligation to liberalize capital movements progressively "to the extent 
necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market" (Art. 
67). Not much progress had been made in this field since the early 
'60s. Indeed until just a few years ago, a number of member countries 




























































































degree of liberalization obtained earlier on. With the drive towards the 
completion of the internal market and in view of the successful 
operation of the EMS, it was increasingly felt that there could be no 
complete internal market without fully integrated financial markets.
The EMS, characterized by an increasing convergence of economic 
developments and common procedures in a number of areas of monetary and 
exchange-rate policies, should be complemented by the full 
liberalization of capital movements. The 1988 directive requires in 
general the complete liberalization of capital movements by 
June 30, 1990. For a number of countries which still rely extensively 
on capital controls (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), a 
transitional period extends to the end of 1992, and in the case of 
Greece and Portugal, a further extension of up to three years may be 
approved. Belgium and Luxembourg undertook to formally abolish the dual 
exchange market by the end of 1992. 1/
A lively debate ensued as to whether the EMS could continue to 
operate smoothly and, indeed, continue to exist under full 
liberalization of capital movements. A number of observers argued that 
the EMS had been held together by widespread capital controls. This 
compensated for the differing economic and financial strengths of
1/ For a description of the directive, see International Monetary 
Fund, IMF Survey, August 29, 1988. For a history of capital 
liberalization in the EC, see Leonhard Gleskel Die Liberalisierung des 
Kapitalverkehrs in der EG. Deutsche Bundesbank, Auszüge aus 
Presseartikeln No.48, July 9, 1986. A companion piece of EC 
legislation, the Second Banking Directive, governing the authorization 
of credit institutions and the provision of the financial services 
throughout the EC, was adopted by the EC Council of Minister in December 




























































































participating countries and impeded large-scale speculative capital 
movements related to differentials in fundamentals or changing market 
sentiments and conditions which would trigger and necessitate 
exchange-rate realignments. In sum, fixed exchange rates, free capital 
movements, and independent monetary policies were mutually 
inconsistent. 1/ To enable free capital movements under fixed exchange 
rate conditions would require a common monetary policy and, ultimately, 
a common currency.
Others felt that realignments would continue to be possible without 
the inevitability of large speculative attacks as long as they were 
relatively small and compensated frequently enough for divergences. 
However, the success in achieving convergence in economic performance 
during the last few years would require such realignments less often. 
What was called for was to continue efforts to reach more convergence, 
and free capital movements would exert a disciplinary influence to this 
end. The coordination of monetary policies, particularly with regard to 
interest rates, would have to play an even more important role than in 
the past in balancing the exchange-rate mechanism. Common monetary 
policies would simply provide a cover for non-convergent policies in 
other areas, allow the development of gaps in competitiveness in the 
absence of exchange rate-induced pressure for internal adjustment, and
1/ See in particular Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa: The EMSï A Long-Term
View, in: Francesco Giavazzi, Stefano Micossi, Marcus Miller (Eds.),
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ultimately lead to an aggravation of existing regional imbalances within 
the EC. 1/
The question that remains under intense discussion is whether too 
fast a pace in the process of institutional development could not undo 
the very achievements of the EMS; and whether definite moves towards 
economic and monetary union would not require a more solid basis in 
terms of compatible economic, in particular fiscal policies, and 
convergent economic developments.
Thus, in a way, although with changed terminology, the old 
difference of opinion between the "monetarists" and the "economists" 
continues to exist. Positions are, however, not as apodictic any more, 
and both sides agree that there is a dynamic interaction between the 
building of institutions and the strengthening of policy coordination.
VII
The debate about the future monetary organization of Europe 
acquired another dimension and received an important impulse in early 
1988 when a number of leading politicians from EC countries expressed 
support for the idea of moving towards an economic and monetary union. 
The debate was broadened and deepened by contributions from other high
1/ For a view on how the liberalization of capital movements will 
affect the working of the EMS, see Paul de Grauwe: Liberalization of
Capital Movements and the EMS, Paper prepared for the conference "The 





























































































officials, mainly from central banks. During the same period several 
non-official groupings as well as personalities from the academic world 
put forward precise and detailed proposals as to how and under what 
conditions a European monetary authority and a common European currency 
could be created. 1/
At its meeting in Hanover on June 27 and 28, 1988 the European 
Council of Heads of State and Government set up a committee chaired by 
Mr. Delors, President of the EC Commission, consisting of the Presidents 
and Governors of the EC central banks and four other well-known 
personalities. The Committee was entrusted with ’’the task of studying 
and proposing concrete stages leading towards [economy and monetary] 
union". The Committee presented its report in April 1989. 2/ In its 
report, the Delors Committee proposed the realization of economic and
1/ Balladur (1988); Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Memorandum for die 
Schaffung eines europaischen Wahrungsraumes und einer europaischen 
Zentralbank, February 26, 1988, published in: Deutsche Bundesbank,
Ausziige aus Presseartikeln, March, 1988; Gerhard Stoltenberg: The
further development of monetary cooperation in Europe, Press Release of 
the Federal Ministry of Finance, Bonn, March 15, 1988; Lamberto Dini, 
Statement for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy of the European Parliament, Brussels, July 13, 1988, 
in: BIS Review, July 14, 1988; W.F. Duisenberg, Speech at the American
Chamber of Commerce, The Hague, June 1, 1988, in: BIS Review, June 2,
1988; Norbert Kloten: Wege zu einem Europaischen Zentralbanksystem, in:
Europa-Archiv, June 10, 1988 (English version in: BIS Review, July 19,
1988); Committee for the Monetary Union of Europe (Co-chairmen: Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt): A Programme for Action, June 1988;
Daniel Gros, Niels Thygesen: The EMS - Achievements, Current Issues and
Directions for the Future, CEPS Paper No. 35, Brussels 1988; Marcello de 
Cecco, A. Giovannini (Eds.): A European Central Bank? Perspectives on
monetary unification after ten years of the EMS, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. For a discussion of several publications, see Russo 
(1988), pp.300-303.
2/ Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union: Report on





























































































monetary union in three stages. No deadlines were suggested for the 
transition from one stage to another; instead, the beginning of each 
stage should be decided individually depending on the progress achieved 
during the preceding stage.
Monetary union is characterized in the report by the total and 
irreversible convertibility of currencies; the complete liberalization 
of capital movements and the full integration of financial markets; the 
elimination of fluctuation margins and the irreversible locking of 
exchange rates. Economic union is defined as a single market within 
which persons, goods, services and capital can freely move, with common 
competition, structural and regional policies; and macroeconomic policy 
coordination including binding rules for budgetary policies.
At the heart of the Delors report is the proposal to create a 
single currency and to set up a European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
The ESCB should be federally organized and consist of a central 
institution and the national central banks. The ESCB would be committed 
to the objective of price stability, and - subject to the foregoing - 
should support the general economic policy set at the Community level. 
The ESCB would be responsible for the formulation and implementation of 
monetary policy, and exchange rate and reserve management. It would not 
lend to public sector authorities, and should be independent of 
instructions from national governments and Community authorities. In 
the field of economic policy, the report does not propose the creation 
of a new institution. Rather, the roles of existing bodies, such as the 
Council of Ministers, would be modified and extended.




























































































performance through the strengthening of economic and monetary policy 
coordination within the existing institutional framework. In the 
economic field, stage one would center on the completion of the internal 
market and the reduction of existing regional disparities. In the 
monetary field, the objective of a single financial area would be fully 
implemented. All EC currencies should participate in the EMS exchange 
rate mechanism. The Committee of Central Bank Governors would formulate 
opinions on the overall orientation of monetary and exchange rate policy 
and would express opinions to individual governments and the Council of 
Ministers.
In stage two, the ESCB would be set up and would absorb existing 
institutions such as the European Monetary Cooperation Fund and the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors. The key task for the ESCB would be 
to begin the transition from the coordination of independent monetary 
policies to a common monetary policy. The margins of fluctuation within 
the ERM would be narrowed. The final stage would commence with a move 
to irrevocably locked exchange rates. Common structural and regional 
policies would be further strengthened and rules in the macro-economic 
and budgetary field would become binding. The transition to a single 
monetary policy would be made, and the ESCB would assume all its 
responsibilities. Decisions on exchange market interventions in third 
currencies would become the sole responsibility of the ESCB, and 
official reserves would be pooled and managed by the ESCB. The 
change-over to a single currency would take place during this stage.
A new Treaty would be required since the EEC Treaty was 
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The report lists two options: a new Treaty for each stage, and a single
comprehensive Treaty for the process as a whole. In its report, the 
Committee expresses a preference for the latter approach and calls for a 
clear political commitment to the final stage, i.e. the full realization 
of economic and monetary union.
At a meeting on June 26 and 27, 1989, in Madrid, the European 
Council "restated its determination to progressively achieve Economic 
and Monetary Union". The Council felt that the realization of the 
recommendations of the Delors Committee "would have to take account of 
the parallelism between economic and monetary aspects, respect the 
principle of ’subsidiarity' and allow for the diversity of specific 
situations". The Council decided that the first stage of the realization 
of economic and monetary union, as proposed in the Delors report, would 
begin on July 1, 1990, and asked the Council of Ministers, the 
Commission, the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Monetary 
Committee "to adopt the provisions necessary for the launch of the first 
stage on 1 July 1990" and "to carry out the preparatory work for the 
organization of an intergovernmental conference to lay down the 
subsequent stages". 1/
While the European Council thus agreed on procedures regarding the 
realization of economic and monetary union, the views as to the main 
issues involved continue to differ widely. On the one hand, it is felt
1/ Since this paper was written, the European Council at its meeting 
in Strasbourg on December 8 and 9, 1989 agreed to call, before the end 
of 1990, an Intergovernmental Conference charged with preparing an 





























































































by a number of countries that common policies and institutions should be 
in place as soon as possible. 1/ Other countries argue for extended 
"dress rehearsals" during the first stage proposed in the Delors report 
and stress the need to intensify policy coordination and to achieve more 
and irreversible progress in economic convergence - a "hardening" of the 
EMS - before it could be contemplated to institutionalize and 
permanently determine common aspects of economic and monetary policy in 
the EC. 2/ One country - the United Kingdom - remains fundamentally 
opposed to any early substantial move toward economic and monetary 
union. 3/
1/ A similar view is presented by the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy of the European Parliament in its 
report on European Monetary Integration, January 1989.
2/ For one such view, see Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim 
Bundesministerium for Wirtschaft: Europaische Wahrungsordnung, Bonn,
January 21, 1989.
3/ See Financial Times, April 18, 1989; and House of Commons,
Official Report: Parliamentary Debates, Thursday 29 June 1989, London,
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